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We prove the unconditional security of coherent-state-based differential phase shift quantum key
distribution protocol (DPSQKD) with block-wise phase randomization. Our proof is based on the
conversion of DPSQKD to an equivalent entanglement-distillation protocol where the estimated
phase error rate determines the amount of the privacy amplification. The generated final key has a
contribution from events where the sender emits two or more photons, indicating the robustness of
DPSQKD against photon-number-splitting attacks.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the first unconditional security proof of quantum
key distribution (QKD) by Mayers [1], quantum informa-
tion theory has deepened our understanding on security
that is guaranteed by quantum mechanics. One of the
rigorous and intuitive security proofs [2–4] is based on
the conversion of a given QKD protocol to a mathemati-
cally equivalent entanglement distillation protocol (EDP)
[5], where the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) distill
qubit pairs in a maximally entangled state (Bell state).
In this proof technique, the amount of the privacy ampli-
fication is determined from the phase error rate of shared
qubit pairs prior to distillation. Thus the estimation of
the phase error rate is the central problem in this ap-
proach. One of the difficulties in the estimation lies in
the fact that the eavesdropper (Eve) may not attack on
each pulse independently, but she may interact a train of
pulses coherently with her single quantum system. Hence
we are not allowed to assume that the state of the pairs
shared by Alice and Bob are identically and indepen-
dently distributed (i.i.d.). Various techniques have been
proposed for solving this problem to treat the pairs as
if they are almost i.i.d., such as the use of the random
sampling theorem [2], its generalized version to quantum
mechanics [6], Azuma’s inequality [7, 8], and quantum De
Finetti theorem [9]. With these techniques, we are able
to focus on the statistics of a single pair, which greatly
simplifies the proof. The security of many QKD proto-
cols have been proven along this line [10].
There are QKD protocols, however, for which it seems
to be difficult to prove the security with these techniques.
Examples include differential phase shift QKD protocol
(DPSQKD) [11] and coherent one-way protocol (COW
protocol) [12], which are in the family of the so-called
phase distributed protocols. In these protocols, we em-
ploy a train of pulses in coherent states and use the rel-
ative phases between the adjacent pulses to encode the
bit information of the key. The receiver can read them
out simply by optically superposing two adjacent pulses
by using a optical delay line. Despite this notable sim-
plicity in the implementation, it has been expected that
these protocols are robust against photon-number split-
ting (PNS) attacks that have been found to be threats
against many protocols using weak coherent laser pulses.
On the other hand, the structure of encoding on every
pair of adjacent pulses is rather a nuisance if one tries
to prove the security of these protocols. Since the whole
train of pulses are linked together by the phase relations,
we are no longer allowed to work on each pulse separately,
and we may have to work on a larger Hilbert space for the
estimation of the phase error rate, which makes the secu-
rity proof difficult [13]. So far, the security of DPSQKD
with a single-photon source was proved in [14], but the
robustness against PNS attacks cannot be deduced from
the proof in which there are no events of multiple photon
emission by the sender.
In this paper, with no assumption on the attacks avail-
able to an eavesdropper, we prove the security of DP-
SQKD with trains of weak coherent pulses employing
block-wise phase randomization, where Alice applies a
common random phase shift on every pulse in a block of
fixed number n of pulses. This allows us to use Azuma’s
inequality to cope with coherent attacks. As for Bob, we
assume that he uses detectors that discriminate among
the three cases of the vacuum, a single photon, and two
or more photons. We calculate the final key rates numer-
2ically as a function of channel transmission (distance be-
tween Alice and Bob) and the observed bit error rate, and
confirm the expected robustness of the DPSQKD proto-
col against the PNS attacks. For the security proof, we
introduce an EDP that is shown to be equivalent to the
DPSQKD protocol, and pursue the relation between the
bit error rate, which can be directly estimated, and the
phase error rate, which determines a sufficient amount
of privacy amplification to make the final key secure.
Although the relevant Hilbert space for communication
with n pulses is very large with its dimension exponen-
tial in n, we will show that the symmetry in the protocol
renders the relevant observables in a block diagonalized
form, which allows us to work essentially on n-by-n ma-
trices.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we de-
scribe the DPSQKD protocol in detail and clarify the as-
sumptions on the devices used by Alice and Bob. Then
we introduce an alternative protocol (EDP-DPS) based
on entanglement distillation and show that it is equiva-
lent to the DPSQKD protocol. In Sec. III, we develop our
security proof and explain how to calculate lower bounds
on the secure key rate. Sec. IV shows explicitly how the
bit error and the phase error are related to each other,
depending on the number of photons emitted from the
sender. In Sec. V, we show numerical results on the key
rates for various values of the channel transmission, the
bit error rate, and the block length n. Then we summa-
rize this paper in Sec. VI.
II. DPSQKD AND ITS EQUIVALENCE TO
EDP-DPS
In this section, we first describe the protocol of DP-
SQKD together with our assumptions on the photon de-
tectors. We then argue that the DPSQKD protocol is
equivalent to a protocol involving entanglement distilla-
tion, which we call the EDP-DPS protocol. Throughout
this paper, we use the following notations:
Pˆ (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉 〈φ| (1)
for vector |φ〉 that is not necessarily unnormalized, and
Hˆ ≡ 1√
2
∑
s,s′=0,1
(−1)ss′ |s〉 〈s′| (2)
for the Hadamard operator acting on a qubit.
A. Setup of DPSQKD and assumptions
The setup for DPSQKD uses a laser source emitting
a long train of pulses and a phase shifter at Alice’s site,
and one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer followed
by two photon detectors at Bob’s site (see Fig. 1). The
interferometer introduces a delay equal to the interval
of the neighboring pulses, such that photon detection at
D1
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FIG. 1: Schematics of setup for DPSQKD. Alice sends out a
train of coherent pulses after randomly applying a phase shift,
either δ or δ + pi, to each pulse. Here, δ is a common offset
randomly chosen between 0 and 2pi. Bob uses a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer (depicted as MZ) with a delay matched to the
interval of the pulses, followed by photon detectors. We call
the first beam splitter of MZ the shifting beam splitter, and
the second one the interacting beam splitter.
an appropriate timing (we call it jth time slot) tells Bob
whether the relative phase shift between the neighboring
pulses (jth and (j+1)th pulses) is 0 or π. We call the first
beam splitter of the interferometer as the shifting beam
splitter and the second beam splitter as the interacting
beam splitter.
Although the protocol described below regards a se-
quence of n pulses as a block, the security analysis does
not assume that the pulses outside of the block should be
in the vacuum. Hence Alice has no need to introduce an
optical shutter to extract a train composed of exactly n
pulses, and her source may emit a indefinitely long train
of pulses.
Throughout this work, we assume that Bob uses
photon-number-resolving detectors, which can discrim-
inate among the vacuum, a single-photon, and multi-
photons. As for the imperfections of the detectors, we
assume that the inefficiency (a non-unit quantum effi-
ciency) of a detector is modeled by a linear absorber
followed by a perfect detector with unit quantum effi-
ciency. We further assume that the two detectors have
the same quantum efficiency. Then the inefficiency can
be modeled by a common linear absorber placed in front
of the interferometer, which may be under Eve’s control.
As for the dark countings of the detectors, we assume
that they are statistically independent and uniform such
that it is modeled by Eve’s injection of spurious photons
to the interferometer. Finally, we do not consider any
side-channels.
B. DPSQKD
The protocol of DPSQKD runs as follows.
(1) Alice generates a random n-bit sequence ~s ≡
s1s2 · · · sn and a random (common) phase shift δ ∈
[0, 2π). She prepares a sequence of n pulses in the co-
herent state
⊗n
i=1
∣∣eiδ(−1)siα〉
i
and sends them to Bob
through a quantum channel.
(2) Bob receives the n pulses and puts them into the
shifting beam splitter followed by the interacting beam
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FIG. 2: Schematics of Alice’s quantum circuit. The inputs
are the jth and (j + 1)th qubits, which are subjected to a
C-NOT gate followed by an Hadamard gate (H) on the jth
qubit. The (j+1)th qubit is then measured on Z-basis (MZ).
If the measurement outcome is 0, a phase flip gate is applied
to the jth qubit with probability 1/2, which is denoted by
I/Z. If the outcome is 1, the jth qubit is left untouched.
splitter. Then he performs photon detection by using
the photon number resolving detectors. Let us call the
event detected if he detects exactly one photon in jth(1 ≤
j ≤ n− 1) time slot and detects the vacuum in all of the
other n time slots (including the 0th and nth ones). If
the event is not detected, Alice and Bob skip steps (3)
and (4) below.
(3) Bob takes note of the detected bit value and an-
nounces the number j over the authenticated public chan-
nel.
(4) Alice takes note of the bit value sj ⊕ sj+1.
(5) Alice and Bob repeat (1) thorough (4) N times.
Let QN be the number of the detected events. At this
point, Alice and Bob should have their own records of
QN bits.
(6) Alice and Bob randomly select a small portion ξ of
the QN detected events, and compare the bit values over
the public channel. This gives the estimate of the rate e
and hence of the number eQN(1− ξ) of bit errors in the
remaining portion.
(7) Alice and Bob discuss over the public channel to
perform error correction and privacy amplification on the
remaining portion to share a final key of length GN(1−
ξ).
C. Alternative procedures
Here we consider equivalent ways of carrying out var-
ious procedures appearing in the DPSQKD protocol, in
order to reduce it to a protocol based on an entangle-
ment distillation protocol (EDP). Suppose that Alice has
a quantum register of n qubits. Let HA =
⊗n
i=1HA,i be
the Hilbert space for the n qubits, and define a state
|Φ′δ〉 ≡ 2−n/2
∑
~s
n⊗
i=1
(Hˆ |si〉A,i)
∣∣eiδ(−1)siα〉
i
over the n qubits and the n optical pulses. Alice’s pro-
cedure at step (1) in the DPSQKD can be equivalently
done by preparing state |Φ′δ〉 with random δ and by ex-
tracting ~s through a measurement on the n qubits. Al-
ternatively, let us introduce an auxiliary system c with
a Hilbert space spanned by an orthonormal basis {ν}∞ν=0
and define
|Φ〉 ≡ 2−n/2
∑
~s
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉c πˆν
n⊗
i=1
(Hˆ |si〉A,i) |(−1)siα〉i ,
(3)
where πˆν is the projection onto the subspace for which
the total photon number in the n optical pulses is ν. Alice
can carry out step (1) starting with state |Φ〉 instead of
|Φ′δ〉 since
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
dδ |Φ′δ〉 〈Φ′δ| = Trc |Φ〉 〈Φ|
holds.
What Alice eventually needs about the sequence ~s in
the DPSQKD is the single bit value sj ⊕ sj+1 in step
(4). This bit can be alternatively extracted by applying
a quantum circuit shown in Fig. 2 and measuring the
output qubit (which is renamed as Aq) in the standard
(Z) basis. Notice that the random phase flip conditioned
on the outcome of the measurement on the other qubit
has no effect on the Z-basis ({|0〉 , |1〉}-basis) measure-
ment. The action of the circuit is also described by a
set of measurement operators {Mˆ (j)k : HA,j ⊗ HA,j+1 →HAq}k=1,2,3 defined as
Mˆ
(j)
1 = Hˆ |0〉Aq (A,j 〈0|A,j+1 〈1|)
+Hˆ |1〉Aq (A,j 〈1|A,j+1 〈0|),
Mˆ
(j)
2 =
1√
2
|0〉Aq (A,j 〈0|A,j+1 〈0|+ A,j 〈1|A,j+1 〈1|),
Mˆ
(j)
3 =
1√
2
|1〉Aq (A,j 〈0|A,j+1 〈0| − A,j 〈1|A,j+1 〈1|).
(4)
As for Bob, he can determine whether the event is de-
tected or not, prior to the determination of the detected
time slot and the bit value. To do this, suppose that
he sends only the 1st and the nth pulse to the shifting
beamsplitters (see Fig. 3 ). After the 1st pulse is split,
one of the two halved pulses propagates toward the in-
teracting beamsplitter of the 1st time slot, and let us call
it the 1st half pulse. Similarly, the nth half pulse goes
to the one for the (n − 1)th time slot. Bob then carries
out the quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement of
the total photon number among the 1st half pulse, the
nth half pulse, and the remaining (n− 2) original pulses
(2 ≤ i ≤ n−1). For the rest of the pulses, he finishes the
measurement for the 0th and the nth time slots as in the
DPSQKD. It is not difficult to see that the event should
be detected if and only if the QND measurement reveals
exactly one photon and both the 0th and the nth time
slots are found in the vacuum.
When the event is detected, the state of the n pulses
after the QND measurement is contained in the subspace
HB spanned by n states, which we denote {|i〉B}ni=1, with
4. . . . . .
QNDj=0
j=1 j=2 j=n-1
j=n
i=1      i=2     i=3                             i=n-1   i=n
FIG. 3: An equivalent description of Bob’s measurement ap-
paratus. The branching arrows represent the splitting of a
pulse by the shifting beam splitter of MZ in Fig. 1, while the
intersecting corresponds to the superposition at the interact-
ing beam splitter. The dotted arrows represent the pulses
split from the neighboring blocks. The QND measurement in
the EDP-DPS is applied to the n pulses confined in the box
designated as QND in the figure. Bob’s quantum register B
is also defined to be the single-photon subspace for these n
pulses.
i representing the position of the single photon (at the
half pulse when i = 1, n and at the original pulse other-
wise). Let us call this subspace as Bob’s quantum register
B. Determination of the detected time slot j and the bit
value in DPSQKD is regarded as a generalized measure-
ment on the register B. Let Πˆj,s be the POVM elements
for the bit value s detected at the time slot j. Consid-
ering the action of the beamsplitters, they are written
as
Πˆj,s =
1
2
Pˆ (
√
κj |j〉B + (−1)s
√
κj+1 |j + 1〉B (5)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 with
κ1 = κn = 1, κi = 1/2 (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1). (6)
This measurement can be further decomposed into two
consecutive measurements. The first one is a filtering
operation, which gives the outcome j and leaves a qubit
HBq. It is described by a set of measurement operators
Fˆj : HB → HBq. The second one measures the qubit on
the standard basis {|0〉Bq , |1〉Bq}. The entire procedure
is equivalent to the POVM {Πˆj,s} if Fˆ †j Pˆ (|s〉Bq)Fˆj =
Πˆj,s, which is satisfied by the following choice
Fˆj =
√
κjHˆ |1〉Bq B 〈j|+
√
κj+1Hˆ |0〉Bq B 〈j + 1| . (7)
D. EDP-DPS
The alternative procedures by Alice and Bob described
above lead to the following protocol (EDP-DPS) that is
equivalent to DPSQKD in terms of the security.
(V1) Alice prepares the state |Φ〉 and sends the n pulses
to Bob through a quantum channel.
(V2) Bob receives the n pulses and carries out the QND
measurement in Fig. 3 to test whether there is exactly
one photon in total among the 1st half pulse, the nth
half pulse, and the remaining (n−2) original pulses (2 ≤
i ≤ n− 1). He also tests whether both of the 0th and the
nth time slot are in the vacuum. The event is detected if
both of the tests are qualified. If the event is not detected,
Alice and Bob skip steps (V3) and (V4) below.
(V3) When the event was detected, Bob’s quantum
registerB is measured with measurement operators {Fj}.
He stores the output qubit Bq and announces the out-
come j, which is the position of the detected time slot,
over the authenticated public channel.
(V4) Alice applies the quantum circuit in Fig. 2 to the
jth and (j + 1)th qubit of her quantum register A, and
stores the output qubit Aq. She also measures system c
to learn the total photon number ν.
(V5) Alice and Bob repeat (V1) through (V4) N times.
Let QN be the number of the detected events. At this
point, Alice and Bob should share QN pairs of qubits.
(V6) Alice and Bob randomly select a small portion ξ
of the QN detected events, measures the qubits in the
standard basis, and compare the bit values over the pub-
lic channel. This gives the estimate of the rate e and
hence of the number eQN(1 − ξ) of bit errors in the re-
maining portion.
(V7) Alice and Bob discuss over the public channel to
conduct entanglement distillation on the remaining qubit
pairs, followed by the measurements on the standard ba-
sis to agree on a final key of length GN(1− ξ).
Here the equivalence of steps (7) and (V7) follows from
the discussion in [3]. The final key rate G is determined
through the statistics of the occurrence of the phase error
in the QN(1− ξ) pairs in step (V7), which is analyzed in
detail in the next section.
III. SECURITY PROOF OF EDP-DPS
In this section, we prove the security of EDP-DPS. Our
proof is based on the Shor-Preskill security proof where
Alice and Bob distill out a number of qubit pairs in a
state whose fidelity to as many copies of the Bell state
(|0〉 |0〉 + |1〉 |1〉)/√2 approaches unity exponentially in
the number of pairs. The key generated from the distilled
state is then secure in the sense of composable security
[15]. According to Shor and Preskill, this virtual distil-
lation protocol can be translated to error correction and
privacy amplification schemes in the actual QKD proto-
col to obtain a final key of the same security. The length
of the final key is determined from the amount of error
correction, which reflects the bit error rate, and from the
amount of privacy amplification, which is related to the
amount of phase errors in the qubit pairs before the dis-
tillation. For simplicity, here we assume the asymptotic
limit of large N in which ξ is negligible, and the efficiency
of the error correction reaches the Shannon limit. Then
5the rate G of the final key per transmission of n pulses is
written as
G = Q
[
1− h (e)− h(ph)
]
, (8)
where h(x) ≡ −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x). The number
h(ph) implies the entropy of the occurrence of phase er-
rors, in the sense that the number of phase error patterns
possible in the l ≡ QN qubit pairs prior to distillation is
given by 2lh
(ph)
. Our goal is to determine an upper-bound
on h(ph) from the bit error rate e and the detection rate
Q.
A. Bit and phase error rates
In order to see how the bit errors and the phase er-
rors are related, we regard the occurrence of a bit or a
phase error as an outcome of a measurement on Alice and
Bob’s quantum registers A and B just after the event is
detected at step (V2), and write down the corresponding
POVM elements. For the occurrence of a bit error from
the time slot j, the POVM element is given by
eˆj =
∑
s,s′
Pˆ (Hˆ |s〉A,j)Pˆ (Hˆ |s′〉A,j+1)Πˆj,s⊕s′⊕1. (9)
Here and henceforth, we omit identity operators on sub-
systems, like the ones for Alice’s (n− 2) irrelevant qubits
in the above expression. The occurrence of a phase error
is defined to be the case where Alice’s qubit Aq and Bob’s
qubit Bq produce different outcomes when they are mea-
sured on the X basis {Hˆ |0〉 , Hˆ |1〉}. The corresponding
POVM element is given by
eˆ
(ph)
j =
∑
s,k
Mˆ
(j)†
k Pˆ (Hˆ |s〉Aq)Mˆ (j)k ⊗ Fˆ †j Pˆ (Hˆ |s¯〉Bq)Fˆj
=
∑
s
[
Pˆ (|s〉A,j |s¯〉A,j+1) +
1
2
Pˆ (|0〉A,j |0〉A,j+1)
+
1
2
Pˆ (|1〉A,j |1〉A,j+1)
]
⊗ κj+sPˆ (|j + s〉B),(10)
where s¯ ≡ s⊕ 1. It is convenient to introduce a unitary
operator Uˆ acting on HA ⊗HB defined by
Uˆ
n⊗
i′=1
(Hˆ |si′〉A,i′) |i〉B = (−1)si
n⊗
i′=1
(Hˆ |si′〉A,i′) |i〉B(11)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then it is straightforward to show that
Uˆ eˆjUˆ
† = Πˆj,1. (12)
By using the relation
Uˆ Pˆ (|s〉A,i)Pˆ (|i′〉B)Uˆ † = Pˆ (|s⊕ δi,i′ 〉A,i)Pˆ (|i′〉B) (13)
we also have
Uˆ eˆ
(ph)
j Uˆ
† =
1
2
[Pˆ (|1〉A,j) + Pˆ (|1〉A,j+1)]
⊗[κjPˆ (|j〉B) + κj+1Pˆ (|j + 1〉B)]. (14)
By taking a sum over the time slots, we obtain the
operators for the bit and phase errors as
eˆ ≡
n−1∑
j=1
eˆj, eˆ
(ph) ≡
n−1∑
j=1
eˆ
(ph)
j . (15)
When the state of Alice and Bob’s quantum registers A
and B just after the event is detected at step (V2) is ρˆ,
the probability of having a bit error in the extracted qubit
pair Aq and Bq is given by Tr(ρˆeˆ). The probability of
having a phase error is given by Tr(ρˆeˆ(ph)). Through the
operator Uˆ , these error operators are concisely written
as follows. For the bit error, we have
Uˆ eˆUˆ † = 1ˆA ⊗ Πˆ (16)
Πˆ ≡
n−1∑
j=1
Πˆj,1, (17)
where 1ˆA is the identity operator acting on HA. On
the basis {|i〉B}, Πˆ is represented by a tri-diagonal real
symmetric matrix. From Eq. (5), we have
B 〈i| Πˆ |i〉B = 1/2 (1 ≤ i ≤ n) (18)
B 〈i| Πˆ |i+ 1〉B = −1/(2
√
2) (i = 1, n− 1) (19)
B 〈i| Πˆ |i+ 1〉B = −1/4 (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 2). (20)
Notice that Πˆ ≥ 0, and that Πˆ(∑i ci |i〉B) = 0 if and
only if
√
2c1 = c2 = · · · = cn−1 =
√
2cn. (21)
The factor of
√
2 comes from the fact that quantum reg-
ister B is defined after the (i = 1) pulse and the (i = n)
pulse are split in half.
For the phase error, let us write the standard basis
states of Alice’s quantum register with n-bit sequence ~a ≡
a1a2 . . . an as |~a〉A ≡ |a1〉A,1 |a2〉A,2 · · · |an〉A,n. Then, us-
ing Eqs. (6) and (14), we have
Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ † =
∑
~a
P (|~a〉A)⊗ Πˆ(ph)~a (22)
with
Πˆ
(ph)
~a ≡ P (|1〉B)
(
δa1,1
2
+
δa2,1
2
)
+
n−1∑
i=2
P (|i〉B)
(
δai−1,1
4
+
δai,1
2
+
δai+1,1
4
)
+P (|n〉B)
(
δan−1,1
2
+
δan,1
2
)
. (23)
On the basis {|i〉B}, Πˆ is tri-diagonal and Πˆ(ph)~a is diag-
onal.
6B. Constraints on the state of quantum registers
Since Alice’s quantum register A and the system c
never leave Alice, Eve can change their state only indi-
rectly through controlling whether the event will be de-
tected or not. As a result, if the initial state |Φ〉 has zero
amplitude for a state vector |~a〉A |ν〉c (〈Φ| |~a〉A |ν〉c = 0),
it stays so after the event is detected, namely, its density
operator ρˆ satisfies ρˆ |~a〉A |ν〉c = 0. The relation between
~a and ν for the vanishing amplitude is derived as follows.
The initial state |Φ〉 in Eq. (3) is written as
|Φ〉 ≡ 2−n
∑
~a
|~a〉A
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉c πˆν
n⊗
i=1
(|α〉i + (−1)ai |−α〉i)
(24)
Since the state |α〉 − |−α〉 contains at least one photon,
we have
A 〈~a| c 〈ν| |Φ〉 = 0 if |~a| > ν, (25)
where |~a| is the weight of the bit sequence ~a, namely, the
number of 1’s in the sequence. Since the state |α〉+ |−α〉
always contains an even number of photons and |α〉−|−α〉
contains an odd number of photons, we also have
A 〈~a| c 〈ν| |Φ〉 = 0 if (−1)|~a| 6= (−1)ν . (26)
Therefore, the state of Alice and Bob’s quantum regis-
ters after the event was detected and system c revealed a
photon number ν is contained in the range of projection
operator Pˆ (ν) defined as
Pˆ (ν) ≡
∑
~a:|~a|=ν,ν−2,ν−4,...
n∑
i=1
Pˆ (|~a〉A |i〉B). (27)
The unitary Uˆ transforms this projection as
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ † =
∑
~a:|~a|=ν−1,ν−3,...
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ 1ˆB
+
∑
~a:|~a|=ν+1
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Pˆ~a (28)
with
Pˆ~a ≡
n∑
i=1
δai,1P (|i〉B). (29)
C. Relation between the bit and phase errors
The relation between the bit and phase errors can be
conveniently expressed through the quantity Ω(ν)(λ) for
λ ≥ 0, which is defined as the largest eigenvalue of the
operator
Pˆ (ν)(eˆ(ph) − λeˆ)Pˆ (ν) (30)
in the range of Pˆ (ν). The definition ensures that for any
state ρˆ in the range of Pˆ (ν), the probability of a phase
error is bounded as
Tr(ρˆeˆ(ph)) ≤ λTr(ρˆeˆ) + Ω(ν)(λ) . (31)
Suppose that at step (V5) of the EDP-DPS, Alice and
Bob findNQq(ν) pairs of qubits for which Alice has found
the total photon number to be ν at step (V4). Imagine
one sequentially measures these qubit pairs in the Bell
basis, one pair after another, to count the number of bit
errors and phase errors. Regardless of Eve’s attack, the
above inequality is also true for the conditional probabil-
ities of the occurrence of bit and phase errors in the m-th
pair, conditioned on the outcomes for the (m − 1) pre-
ceding pairs, since ρˆ is arbitrary. Then, using Azuma’s
inequality [7], we are able to show [8] that a similar in-
equality holds for the total number NQq(ν)e(ph,ν) of the
phase errors and the number NQq(ν)e(ν) of the bit errors:
e(ph,ν) ≤ λe(ν) + Ω(ν)(λ) + ǫ .
When NQq(ν) gets larger with any fixed value of ǫ > 0,
the probability of this inequality to be violated decreases
exponentially. Here and henceforth, we consider the limit
of large N and we neglect ǫ so that we assume
e(ph,ν) ≤ λe(ν) +Ω(ν)(λ) (32)
holds.
The above inequality for various values of λ deter-
mines a convex achievable region of (e(ν), e(ph,ν)), which,
in principle, determines the convex achievable region of
(e(ν), h(e(ph,ν))) specified by a set of linear inequalities
h(e(ph,ν)) ≤ γe(ν) +Ω(ν)h (γ) (33)
for various values of γ ≥ 0. The amount of privacy am-
plification h(ph) appearing in the key rate formula Eq. (8)
is then bounded as
h(ph) =
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)h(e(ph,ν)) ≤ γe+
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)Ω
(ν)
h (γ) (34)
for fixed values of {q(ν)}. Here we have used the relation
e =
∑
ν q
(ν)e(ν) for the observed error rate e. The val-
ues of {q(ν)} are freely chosen by Eve under the obvious
constraints from the number of total events where Alice
has emitted ν photons:
NQq(ν) ≤ Ne−nα2 (nα
2)ν
ν!
. (35)
As long as the chain of inequalities
Ω(0)(λ) ≤ Ω(1)(λ) ≤ Ω(2)(λ) ≤ · · · (36)
holds for all λ ≥ 0, Eve loses nothing by using the events
with a larger value of ν. Thus the optimal choice of {q(ν)}
to maximize the right-hand side of Eq. (34) is given by
q(ν)∗ ≡


Q−1pν (ν ≥ νmin + 1)
1−Q−1(1 −∑νminν′=0 pν′) (ν = νmin)
0 (ν ≤ νmin − 1),
(37)
7where {pν} is the Poissonian distribution with mean nα2,
pν ≡ e−nα
2 (nα2)ν
ν!
, (38)
and νmin is the integer satisfying
1−
νmin∑
ν′=0
pν′ < Q ≤ 1−
νmin−1∑
ν′=0
pν′ . (39)
On the other hand, the parameter γ can be freely chosen
to obtain the tightest bound. As a result, we formally
obtain an upper bound on h(ph) as
h(ph) ≤ min
γ
[
γe+
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)∗Ω
(ν)
h (γ)
]
. (40)
In practice, the evaluation of Ω(ν)(λ) is involved for a
large ν, as shown in the next subsection. Hence, for the
key rates calculated in this paper, we used a bound not
as tight as Eq. (40), essentially calculating Ω(ν)(λ) up to
ν = 3. The technical detail of this bound is explained in
Appendix A.
D. Evaluation of Ω(ν)(λ)
Here we explain how to calculate the quantity Ω(ν)(λ)
which is vital for determining the key rate. Since Ω(ν)(λ)
is the largest eigenvalue of Pˆ (ν)(eˆ(ph) − λeˆ)Pˆ (ν) in the
range of Pˆ (ν), it is also the largest eigenvalue of the op-
erator
Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ †(Uˆ eˆ(ph)Uˆ † − λUˆ eˆUˆ †)Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ †
=
∑
~a:|~a|=ν−1,ν−3,...
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ (Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ)
+
∑
~a:|~a|=ν+1
Pˆ (|~a〉A)⊗ Pˆ~a(Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ)Pˆ~a, (41)
in the range of Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ †, where Eqs. (16), (22), and (28)
are used. Since it is a direct sum over various operators
specified by ~a, Ω(ν)(λ) is the largest among the eigen-
values of these operators in the range of Uˆ Pˆ (ν)Uˆ †. Here
we may neglect the operators with |~a| ≤ ν − 3, since the
definition of Πˆ
(ph)
~a in Eq. (23) assures that Πˆ
(ph)
~a ≥ Πˆ(ph)~a′
if ai ≥ a′i for all i. We thus conclude that Ω(ν)(λ) is the
larger of the two numbers Ω
(ν)
− (λ) and Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) defined as
follows; Ω
(ν)
− (λ) is the largest of the eigenvalues of the
operators
{Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ | |~a| = ν − 1}. (42)
Taking {|i〉B} as the basis, one can calculate Ω(ν)− (λ) by
evaluating the largest eigenvalues of various tri-diagonal
n×n matrices designated by n-bit sequences ~a with |~a| =
ν − 1. Ω(ν)+ (λ) is the largest of the eigenvalues of the
operators
{Pˆ~a(Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ)Pˆ~a | |~a| = ν + 1} (43)
in the range of Pˆ~a. Since Πˆ
(ph)
~a − λΠˆ is tri-diagonal,
the off-diagonal element B 〈i′| (Πˆ(ph)~a − λΠˆ) |i〉B vanishes
when |i′ − i| ≥ 2. Eq. (23) assures that the element
B 〈i′′| (Πˆ(ph)~a −λΠˆ) |i′〉B does not depend on ai when |i′−
i| ≥ 2 and |i′′ − i| ≥ 2. We are thus allowed to focus
on a subspace spanned by states |i〉B with ai = 1 for
consecutive values of index i. That is to say, Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) is
given by the largest of the eigenvalues of the operators
{Pˆ~a′(Πˆ(ph)~a′ − λΠˆ)Pˆ~a′ | ~a′ = ~bl,l+k, 0 ≤ k ≤ ν,
1 ≤ l, l + k ≤ n} (44)
in the range of Pˆ~a′ , where ~a
′ = ~bl,k+l means that a
′
i = 0
for i < l or k + l < i, and a′i = 1 for l ≤ i ≤ l + k.
One can thus calculate Ω
(ν)
+ (λ) by evaluating the largest
eigenvalues of various tri-diagonal (k+1)×(k+1) matrices
with k ≤ ν.
From a sequence ~a∗ and an eigenvector
∑
i c
∗
i |i〉B cor-
responding to the largest eigenvalue Ω(ν)(λ), we can also
reconstruct an optimal state of quantum registers AB
that saturates the inequality (31). It is given by
Uˆ †(|~a∗〉A ⊗
∑
i
c∗i |i〉B) =
∑
i
c∗i
∣∣∣~a∗ +~bi〉
A
⊗ |i〉B , (45)
where ~bi is the sequence for which |~b(i)| = 1 and the only
‘1’ is at the i-th bit, and the superscript ∗ represents that
ci is optimal.
IV. EXPLICIT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
BIT AND PHASE ERROR RATES
In the last section, we showed that the final key rate
can be determined from the knowledge of the relation
between the bit error rate e(ν) and the phase error rate
e(ph,ν) for each value of photon number ν emitted by
Alice. In this section, we explicitly calculate the allowed
region of (e(ν), e(ph,ν)) up to ν = 3 by evaluating the
function Ω(ν)(λ) analytically or numerically.
A. Zero-photon part
First we discuss the trivial case of ν = 0, when Alice
has emitted no photons. If we follow the prescription of
the last section, Ω(0)(λ) = Ω
(0)
+ (λ) since Ω
(0)
− (λ) has no
candidates for ν = 0. In Eq. (44), the choice ~a = ~bl,l
results in B 〈l| Πˆ(ph)~a |l〉B = 1/2 and B 〈l| Πˆ |l〉B = 1/2
regardless of l. Hence we have
Ω(0)(λ) = (1− λ)/2, (46)
8which corresponds to a single point (e(0), e(ph,0)) =
(1/2, 1/2). Physically, this is trivial since there should
be no correlations in any basis in the shared qubit pair
when Alice emitted no photons.
B. Single-photon part
In this subsection we consider the case ν = 1, where
a single photon was emitted from Alice. To calculate
Ω(1)(λ), it is suffice to consider the cases |~a| = 0 or |~a| =
2.
Since Πˆ
(ph)
~a = 0 for |~a| = 0, Ω(1)− (λ) is given by the
largest eigenvalue of −λΠˆ, which is zero. This corre-
sponds to the point (e(1), e(ph,1)) = (0, 0), implying that
Eve has done nothing.
When |~a| = 2 with ai = ai′ = 1, it can be interpreted
as Alice has emitted a photon in the i-th pulse and Bob
has received a photon in the i′-th pulse, or vice versa.
In either case, Eve’s attack has moved the location of
the single photon, which typically occurs when Eve tries
to measure the relative phase between the two pulses.
Mathematically, nontrivial choices in Eq. (44) are ~a′ =
~bl,l+1, leading to (2 × 2) matrices
1
4
(
4− 2λ √2λ√
2λ 3− 2λ
)
,
1
4
(
3− 2λ λ
λ 3− 2λ
)
, (47)
for l = 1, n − 1 and 2 ≤ l ≤ n − 2, respectively. The
former matrix always has the largest of the eigenvalues,
leading to Ω
(1)
+ (λ) = (7 − 4λ +
√
1 + 8λ2)/8. Combined
with Ω
(1)
− (λ) = 0, we have
Ω(1)(λ) =
{
0 (λ ≥ 6)
(7− 4λ+√1 + 8λ2)/8 (λ < 6). (48)
Ω(1)(6) = 0 yields an inequality
e(ph,1) ≤ 6e(1), (49)
which is saturated for 0 ≤ e(1) ≤ 5/34 (0 ≤ e(ph,1) ≤
15/17). Hence we have h(e(ph,1)) ≤ h(6e(1)) for
0 ≤ e(1) ≤ 1/12. This is rewritten as h(e(ph,1)) ≤
6h′(6e˜)(e(1) − e˜) + h(6e˜) for a constant e˜ with 0 ≤ e˜ ≤
1/12, which gives the form of Ω
(1)
h (γ) in Eq. (33) implic-
itly as
Ω
(1)
h (γ) = h(6e˜)− γe˜ for γ = 6h′(6e˜). (50)
C. Two-photon part
For the cases where Alice emitted two photons (ν = 2),
the evaluation of Ω(2)(λ) = max{Ω(2)+ (λ),Ω(2)− (λ)} in-
volves calculation of the largest eigenvalues of n-by-n
matrices, which we have done numerically. It has turned
out that, irrespective of block size n, Ω
(2)
+ (λ) is always
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FIG. 4: (a) The upper bound on the phase error rate e(ph,2)
as a function of the bit error rate e(2) for the two-photon
part. From top to bottom, the curves correspond to the case
of n = 4, n = 7, and n = 9, respectively. (b) Magnification of
the low bit error region.
determined by the choice ~a = 11100 . . .0 among various
values of ~a with |~a| = 3, while Ω(2)− (λ) is determined
by ~a = 0100 . . .0 which gives an eigenvalue no smaller
than any other ~a with |~a| = 1. Whether Ω(2)+ (λ) is larger
than Ω
(2)
− (λ) or not depends on λ; With a constant λ0
which is solely dependent on n, Ω
(2)
+ (λ) ≤ Ω(2)− (λ) for
λ ≥ λ0, while Ω(2)+ (λ) > Ω(2)− (λ) for λ0 > λ ≥ 0. As a
result, the boundary of (e(2), e(ph,2)) consists of two con-
vex curves determined from Ω
(2)
± (λ) and a straight line
with slope λ0 connecting them, which is shown in Fig.
4 for n = 4, 7, 9. Eve’s best strategy is thus to use the
subspace with ~a = 0100 . . .0 for smaller values of e(2) and
e(ph,2) (low-error regime), while she should mix it with
the subspace with ~a = 1110 . . .0 for achieving larger val-
ues of e(2) and e(ph,2) (high-error regime). We also see
that as n gets larger, the bound on the phase error rate
becomes tighter.
In order to clarify the nature of Eve’s optimal strategy,
let us consider a state on Alice’s and Bob’s quantum
registers AB, which is written in the form (see Eq. (45))∑
i
ci
∣∣∣~a+~bi〉
A
⊗ |i〉B . (51)
Fig. 5 shows the amplitudes {|ci|2} for examples of states
achieving the maximal phase error in the low-error regime
with ~a = 0100 . . .0. Mathematically, we see from Eq. (23)
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FIG. 5: The optimal values of {|ci|2} for e(2) = 0.00010 (solid
lines) and e(2) = 0.00655 (dashed lines), when n = 9.
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FIG. 6: The optimal values of {|ci|2} for e(2) = 0.06712 and
n = 9. {ci} for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 are exactly zero. The straight
line in Fig. 4(a) is achieved by a mixture of this state and
the state (with the higher error rate, depicted by the dashed
line) shown in Fig. 5.
that Eve wants to give larger weights on |c1|2 through
|c3|2 to increase the phase error rate. On the other hand,
as Eq. (21) shows, she must keep {|ci|2} almost uniform
in order to avoid the increase of the bit errors. As a
result, for e(2) almost zero, the distribution {|ci|2} is al-
most uniform, and it starts to cluster around i = 2 when
e(2) increases. Note that the values at the edges |c1|2 and
|c9|2 are halved due to the particular definition of Bob’s
quantum register B (see Fig. 3). We may give a rough
physical interpretation of this behavior as follows. The
amplitude ci represents the event where Alice emitted a
photon in the second pulse and another in the i-th pulse,
and Bob received a photon in the i-th pulse. This means
that Eve has stolen the photon in the second pulse in a
PNS attack. Obviously, Eve gains nothing if Bob receives
a photon far from the second pulse (i ≥ 4), and so Eve
should decrease the rate of such events as best as possible
while keeping the bit error rate low.
Similarly, optimal amplitudes for the high error regime
is shown in Fig. 6. The bit error rate is chosen for the
point where the straight line in Fig. 4(a) meets the curve
specified by Ω
(2)
+ (λ). For ~a = 1110 . . .0, only c1, c2, and
c3 can be nonzero, implying that the distribution is far
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FIG. 7: Color online: Comparison of the upper bounds on
the phase error rates for one-, two-, and three-photon parts.
The black, blue, and red solid curves are bounds for ν =
2, respectively corresponding to n = 4, n = 7, and n =
9. The blue and red dashed curves are bounds for ν = 3,
respectively corresponding to n = 7, and n = 9. (All the
region is achievable for n = 4 and ν = 3.) The green curve
represents the bound for ν = 1, which is independent of n.
from the uniform one and the bit error rate is high. As
discussed in the case of ν = 1, this can be understood
as Eve tries to measure the relative phase between i = 1
and i = 2 or between i = 2 and i = 3.
D. Three-photon part and comparison
The case for ν = 3 can be calculated in a similar
manner as for ν = 2, and it was confirmed that the
boundary is achieved by states with ~a = 11110 . . .0 and
~a = 0110 . . .0, or a mixture of them. We compare the
upperbounds on the phase error rate for ν = 0, 1, 2, 3 (see
Fig. 7). The bound for ν = 1 is independent of n. No
bound is shown for n = 4 and ν = 3 since all the region is
achievable in this case. The achievable region for ν = 0
is a point (1/2, 1/2) and is not shown in the figure. This
explicitly verifies Ω(0)(λ) ≤ Ω(1)(λ) ≤ Ω(2)(λ) ≤ Ω(3)(λ)
(see Eq. (36)).
V. KEY GENERATION RATES
In this section, we show examples of the key generation
rates by using a model of the transmission channel. We
assume an optical channel with linear losses, which are
characterized by a single-photon transmission rate of η.
As a source of errors, we assume only alignment errors
which lead to a constant error rate e for every time slot,
regardless of the value of η. With this model, we may use
e directly in the theory, and the detection rate Q that we
need for calculating the key rate is given by
Q = (n− 1)ηα2e−(n+1)ηα2 , (52)
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FIG. 8: Color online: The key generation rate as a function
of η for (a) n = 4 and (b) n = 9. The bit error rate is
set to e = 3%. The solid lines are the rates considering the
contribution up to the three photon parts (ν = 3), and the
dashed lines use only the single-photon part (ν = 1). The
mean photon number per block nα2 is either 0.02 (black) or
0.004 (red).
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FIG. 9: The key generation rate as a function of η for n = 4
and n = 9, with the mean photon number nα2 optimized for
each value of η. The bit error rate is set to e = 3%. The
solid curves are the rates considering the contribution up to
the two photon parts (ν = 2), and the dashed curves use only
the single-photon part (ν = 1). The two lower curves are for
n = 4.
reflecting the probability of (n − 1) time slots receiving
one photon in total and 2 time slots receiving zero pho-
ton.
In Fig. 8, we plot the key generation rate for e = 3%
and n = 4, 9 as a function of η. We picked up two cases of
the mean photon number of the pulses, nα2 = 0.004 and
nα2 = 0.02. In each case, we apply two types of analyses
to calculate the key rate. The first one is to consider
the contribution from the single-photon, the two-photon,
and the three-photon part, which we denote by ν = 3.
The other one is to consider contribution from only the
single-photon part, which we denote by ν = 1. The detail
of each analysis is described in Appendix A. We can see
that for each n and nα2, the key generation from ν = 3
is larger than the one from ν = 1, which indicates the
positive key generation from multiple photons.
In order to assert that contribution from multi-photon
parts do improve the key rate, we compare the key rates
after the optimization over the mean photon number at
each value of η. For this purpose, we limit ourselves to the
analysis up to the two-photon parts (ν = 2), and compare
the rates to those from the ν = 1 analysis. The results for
n = 4, 9 with e = 3% are shown in Fig. 9. We see clearly
that the rate from the ν = 2 analysis exceeds the best
rate from the ν = 1 analysis, which confirms a positive
contribution from the two-photon part. The ratio of the
key rate for ν = 2 to that for ν = 1 is almost constant
over η, and is about 1.1 for n = 4 and 1.5 for n = 9. We
have confirmed that the optimal mean photon number
for each case increases almost linearly as η increases, i.e.,
nα2 ∼= D(ν)η with a constant D(ν) that depends on the
types of analyses. The ratio D(ν = 2)/D(ν = 1) is about
1.4 for n = 9 and 1.1 for n = 4. Hence the inclusion of
the two photon part in the analysis does not only give
an extra portion of the key from the two-photon events,
but also allows us to use more intense pulses to increase
the detection rate itself to improve the key rate.
When the error rate is lower than ∼ 1%, the differ-
ence between the rate from the multi-photon analysis and
that from the single-photon analysis becomes more pro-
nounced, as shown in the logarithmic plots in Fig. 10 for
n = 9. For e = 1%, the key rate shows an O(η2) depen-
dence when η is higher, and the case of ν = 2 is better
than the case of ν = 1 by a constant factor. For this
rate, the mean photon number is chosen as nα2 = O(η).
This behavior is the same as that for e = 3%. But when
η is lower, the rate starts to show an improved depen-
dence of O(η3/2). This is due to the fact that it is possi-
ble to generate the final key solely from the two-photon
events when e = 1%, and hence we have another option
of choosing the mean photon number nα2 to be O(
√
η),
much higher than in the case of e = 3%. When e = 0.5%,
the O(η3/2) dependence already shows up at η as high as
0.01, and the multi-photon rate is much higher than the
single-photon rate. This types of behavior can be also
analytically explained in the limit of η → 0, which is
given in Appendix B.
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FIG. 10: The key generation rate G for n = 9 as a function
of transmission η when the error rate e is low, for e = 1%
(left) and e = 0.5% (right). The solid curves are the rates
considering the contribution up to the two photon parts (ν =
2), and the dashed curves use only the single-photon part
(ν = 1). For the dashed curves, the mean photon number
nα2 is optimized to maximize the rate G. For the solid curves,
the mean photon number is chosen as either nα2 ∼= 0.0987η
or nα2 ∼= 0.0465√η for e = 1%, and nα2 ∼= 0.105√η for
e = 0.5%.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have proved the unconditional se-
curity of coherent-state-based DPS protocol with block-
wise phase randomization. Thanks to the block-wise
phase randomization, Alice’s state is transformed to a
classical mixture of states with fixed numbers of the total
photons, which allows us to analyze each photon-number
space separately. After the calculation of the bounds
on the phase error rate for the single-photon part, the
two-photon part, and the three-photon part, we showed
behavior of the key generation rates assuming a simple
channel model that accommodates losses and misalign-
ment.
The examples of the key generation rates first show
that DPS with a weak coherent pulse train is able to
produce a secret key with no assumptions on the ability
of the eavesdropper. When the bit error rate is rela-
tively large (about 3%), the key generation rate is pro-
portional to O(η2) of the channel transmission η. The
multi-photon emission events contributes to the key rate
as an improvement of a constant factor. When the bit
error rate is small (about 1% or smaller), an improved
scaling, O(η3/2), of the key rate is observed, which im-
plies the key can be generated solely from the two-photon
emission events. These behaviors confirm the expected
robustness of the DPSQKD protocol against the PNS at-
tacks.
We remark that our analysis does not fully exploit the
available data. For instance, we have used the bit error
rate averaged over the block for the security analysis, but
the bit error rate for each time slot is also available in the
experiments. Similarly, our analysis does not take into
account the detection rate for each time slot. Moreover,
for the simplicity of analysis, we considered one-photon
detection per block by Bob, and it will be interesting to
consider multiple detection of a single photons in a block.
We believe that the security proof that fully makes use
of all of them improves the key generation rate, which
we leave for future study. We hope that the ideas intro-
duced this paper is useful for the security proof of the
so-called COW protocol, which shares some similarities
with DPSQKD.
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Appendix A: Calculation of the key rate
Here we describe the procedure we used to determine
the key rates shown in Sec. V. Instead of calculating the
bound Eq. (40) exactly, we used weaker bounds in which
we neglect the contribution of the events where the pho-
ton number ν in Alice’s pulse train is larger than a con-
stant ν, namely, the contribution is considered up to ν
photons. This was done by assuming
Ω(ν)(λ) = 1 (ν ≥ ν + 1), (A1)
which means that
Ω
(ν)
h (γ) = 1 (ν ≥ ν + 1). (A2)
These choices trivially satisfy Eqs. (32) and (33) for any
λ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0.
Three types of analyses, ν = 1, 2 and 3, were used in
Sec. V. The condition of Eq. (36) is now written as
Ω(0)(λ) ≤ Ω(1)(λ) ≤ · · · ≤ Ω(ν)(λ) ≤ 1,
(A3)
which was confirmed to be true in Sec. VB for ν = 1, 2, 3.
This assures that, under the given values of Q and e, the
maximum value of
h(ph) =
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)h(e(ph,ν)) (A4)
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is the same as the maximum value of
h˜(ph) ≡
∞∑
ν=0
q(ν)∗h(e(ph,ν)), (A5)
where {q(ν)∗} are defined in Eq. (37). Let us define
q(ν>ν)∗ ≡
∞∑
ν=ν+1
q(ν)∗, (A6)
and assume q(0)∗ = 0, which is satisfied by normally ob-
served values of Q. Then we have
h˜(ph) ≤ q(ν>ν)∗ +
ν∑
ν=1
q(ν)∗h(e(ph,ν)). (A7)
We will then explain the evaluation of the right-hand side
for each value of ν.
For ν = 1, we use e ≥ q(1)∗e(1) and Eq. (49) to obtain
h(e(ph,1)) ≤ h(6e/q(1)∗) (A8)
for 12e ≤ q(1)∗. Hence we obtain
h(ph) ≤ q(ν>1)∗ + q(1)∗h(6e/q(1)∗) (12e ≤ q(1)∗). (A9)
For ν = 2, we start from
e(ph,2) ≤ Ω(2)(λ) + λe(2), (A10)
we see that for any λ ≥ 0 and e˜ such that 0 ≤ Ω(2)(λ) +
λe˜ ≤ 1/2, we have
h(e(ph,2)) ≤ h(Ω(2)(λ) + λe˜) + γ∗(e(2) − e˜) (A11)
with
γ∗ ≡ h′(Ω(2)(λ) + λe˜) ≥ 0. (A12)
Combining it with Eq. (33), we obtain
q(1)∗h(e(ph,1)) + q(2)∗h(e(ph,2)) ≤ f(λ, e˜) (A13)
with
f(λ, e˜) ≡ γ∗e+ q(1)∗Ω(1)h (γ∗)
+ q(2)∗
[
h(Ω(2)(λ) + λe˜)− γ∗e˜)
]
, (A14)
which leads to a bound
h(ph) ≤ f(λ, e˜) + q(ν>2)∗. (A15)
The evaluation of f(λ, e˜) is not difficult since it is easy
to calculate Ω
(1)
h (γ
∗) for a given numerical value of γ∗
through the use of Eq. (50). In order to obtain the best
bound, it is sufficient to try the following combinations,
{(λ, e˜)|λ ≥ 0, e˜+(λ) ≤ e˜ ≤ e˜−(λ)} (A16)
with
e˜±(λ) ≡ − lim
λ0→λ±0
dΩ(2)(λ0)
dλ0
, (A17)
which is essentially a one-parameter family.
For ν = 3, we define
q(2,3)∗ ≡ q(2)∗ + q(3)∗,
r2 ≡ q(2)∗/q(2,3)∗, r3 ≡ q(3)∗/q(2,3)∗,
e(ph,2,3) ≡ r2e(ph,2) + r3e(ph,3),
e(2,3) ≡ r2e(2) + r3e(3),
Ω(2,3)(λ) ≡ r2Ω(2)(λ) + r3Ω(2)(λ), (A18)
and introduce another compromise in the key rate by the
use of the inequality
q(2)∗h(e(ph,2)) + q(3)∗h(e(ph,3)) ≤ q(2,3)∗h(e(ph,2,3)),
(A19)
which is not necessarily saturated. Starting from
e(ph,2,3) ≤ Ω(2,3)(λ) + λe(2,3), (A20)
we can exactly follow the argument for ν = 2, except that
q(2)∗, Ω(2), and q(ν>2)∗ should be replaced with q(2,3)∗,
Ω(2,3), and q(ν>3)∗, respectively.
Appendix B: Limit of low channel transmission
Here we discuss the behavior of the key rate in the limit
of low channel transmission, η → 0. For comparison, first
we consider the key rate under the assumption that only
the single-photon events (ν = 1) contribute the final key,
namely,
Ω(ν)(λ) = 1 for ν ≥ 2. (B1)
In this case, the amplitude must be at most proportional
to η to mitigate the PNS attacks, resulting in a rate of
raw key proportional to η2. To investigate this quadratic
behavior of the key, we introduce parameters as follows,
α2 = C2η (B2)
G = D2η
2, (B3)
where the subscript 2 implies the quadratic behavior.
Taking only the dominant terms in the limit of η → 0
in Eqs. (8), (37), (40), (52), we have
Q = (n− 1)C2η2 (B4)
y ≡ q(1)∗ = 1− (nα
2)2
2Q
= 1− n
2C2
2(n− 1) (B5)
D2 = (n− 1)C2
{
y[1− Ω(1)h (γ)]− γe− h(e)
}
,(B6)
where we restrict the range of C2 to be
0 ≤ C2 ≤ 2(n− 1)
n2
. (B7)
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Setting γ = 6h′(6e/y) and using Eqs. (B5) and (50), we
obtain
D2 =
2(n− 1)2
n2
(1− y)
[
y − yh
(
6e
y
)
− h(e)
]
(B8)
Hence D2 can be as large as the following quantity
D
(1)
2 (n, e) ≡
2(n− 1)2
n2
max
0≤y≤1
(1 − y)
[
y − yh
(
6e
y
)
− h(e)
]
, (B9)
where the superscript 1 signifies the contribution from
only the single-photon events. Let us define a constant
e
(1)
max
∼= 0.0375 by the equation
1− h(6e(1)max)− h(e(1)max) = 0. (B10)
For e < e
(1)
max, D
(1)
2 (n, e) > 0 and we have a positive key
rate G = D
(1)
2 (n, e)η
2.
Next, let us include the contribution from the two-
photon events (ν = 2) by using Ω(2)(λ) calculated
in Sec. IVC and Ω
(2)
h (γ) that can be calculated from
Ω(2)(λ). In this case, we have
D2 =
2(n− 1)2
n2
(1− y)
{
y[1− Ω(1)h (γ)]
+(1− y)[1− Ω(2)h (γ)]− γe− h(e)
}
. (B11)
As a function of y, D2 is maximal at y = y
∗(γ) with
y∗(γ) ≡ 1− 1− h(e)− γe− Ω
(1)
h (γ)
2[Ω
(2)
h (γ)− Ω(1)h (γ)]
(B12)
when 0 ≤ y∗(γ) ≤ 1. For n ≥ 11, let e = e(1,2)min be the
solution of the following set of equations,
1− h(e)− γe− Ω(1)h (γ)
2[Ω
(2)
h (γ)− Ω(1)h (γ)]
= 1 (B13)
dΩ
(2)
h (γ)
dγ
= −e, (B14)
which depends on n. For n ≤ 10, there is no positive
solution and let e
(1,2)
min ≡ 0. Then it can be shown that
for e
(1,2)
min ≤ e < e(1)max, we have a positive key rate G =
D
(1,2)
2 (n, e)η
2 with
D
(1,2)
2 (n, e) ≡
(n− 1)2
n2
×
max
γ≥0:0≤y∗(γ)≤1
[1− y∗(γ)][1 − h(e)− γe− Ω(1)h (γ)]
(B15)
where it should be noted that Ω
(2)
h (γ) depends also on
n. For e < e
(1,2)
min , there is no maximal point of C2 in the
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FIG. 11: Comparison of the key rates in the limit of low
transmission η → 0, when the contribution from two-photon
emission events are taken into account (the dashed curves) or
not (the dotted curves). When the total mean photon number
nα2 of the n pulses is chosen to scale as O(η), a key rate ofG =
O(η2) is achievable. If we assume that the key is contributed
only from the events where Alice has emitted a single photon,
the key rate scales as G ∼ D(1)2 (n, e)η2, with the coefficient
D
(1)
2 (n, e) being plotted as dotted curves for n = 4 and 9.
When we include the contribution from the events where Alice
has emitted two photons, the key rate is improved to G ∼
D
(1,2)
2 (n, e)η
2, and the coefficient D
(1,2)
2 (n, e) is shown as the
dashed curves.
range of Eq. (B7) and the key rate increases indefinitely
with C2, implying that the scaling is better than O(η
2),
which will be confirmed below. The comparison between
D
(1)
2 (n, e) andD
(1,2)
2 (n, e) for n = 4, 9 is shown in Fig. 11.
The ratioD
(1,2)
2 /D
(1)
2 is only weakly dependent on the bit
error rate e and approximately 1.1 and 1.5 for n = 4 and
n = 9, respectively.
When the bit error rate is as small as ∼ 1%, it is also
possible to extract the key solely from the two-photon
part. This means that α2 is no longer required to be
proportional to η. Instead, we may obtain a positive key
rate with a higher amplitude as
α2 = C3/2η
1/2 (B16)
G = D3/2η
3/2, (B17)
with an improved dependence on the channel transmis-
sion η. For simplicity, we still ignore the contribution
from the events with ν ≥ 3, namely, we assume
Ω(ν)(λ) = 1 for ν ≥ 3. (B18)
Assuming C23/2 ≤ 6(n−1)/n3 and taking dominant terms
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FIG. 12: Coefficients of the key rate G in the limit of low
transmission η → 0. By choosing the total mean photon
number nα2 of the n pulses to scale as O(η), a key rate of
G ∼ D(1,2)2 (n, e)η2 is achievable. The coefficient D(1,2)2 (n, e)
is shown for n = 4, 9 as the broken curves. When e is small, it
is also possible to choose nα2 = O(
√
η), resulting in a better
scaling of the key rate as G ∼ D(2)3/2(n, e)η3/2. The coefficient
D
(2)
3/2
(n, e) is shown for n = 4, 9 as the solid curves.
in the limit of η → 0, we have q(1)∗ = 0 and
Q = (n− 1)C3/2η3/2 (B19)
z ≡ q(2)∗ = 1− (nα
2)3
6Q
= 1−
n3C23/2
6(n− 1) (B20)
D3/2 =
√
6
(
n− 1
n
)3/2
(1− z)1/2 ×{
z[1− Ω(2)h (γ)]− γe− h(e)
}
. (B21)
As a function of z, D3/2 is maximal at z = z
∗(γ) with
z∗(γ) ≡ 1− 1− h(e)− γe− Ω
(2)
h (γ)
3[1− Ω(2)h (γ)]
(B22)
when 0 ≤ z∗(γ) ≤ 1. Let e = e(2)max(n) be the solution of
the following set of equations,
1− h(e)− γe− Ω(2)h (γ) = 0 (B23)
dΩ
(2)
h (γ)
dγ
= −e, (B24)
which depends on n. Examples of the values are
e
(2)
max(4) ∼= 0.0041 and e(2)max(9) ∼= 0.0112. Then, for e <
e
(2)
max(n), we have a positive key rate G = D
(2)
3/2(n, e)η
3/2
with
D
(2)
3/2(n, e) ≡
2
√
6
3
(
n− 1
n
)3/2
×
max
γ≥0:0≤y∗(γ)≤1
[1− z∗(γ)]1/2[1− h(e)− γe− Ω(2)h (γ)].
(B25)
In Fig. 12, D
(2)
3/2(n, e) andD
(1,2)
2 (n, e) are shown for n = 4
and n = 9.
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